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PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONFLICT WITHIN: 
CHALLENGING THE STATE’S NARRATIVE BY ARTISTIC FORMS OF 
PROTEST 
by Alexandra V. Orlova* 
Abstract  
This article follows the Pussy Riot case from the 2012 trial 
decision to the 2018 challenge before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The case revolved around the “punk 
prayer” performed by three women in Christ the Saviour 
Cathedral in Moscow. While the case, which centered on violation 
of freedom of expression, may be framed as a matter of political 
speech vs. religious speech, it has broader implications. Pussy 
Riot’s performance and subsequent legal cases were about the 
ability of pluralism and dissent to counter the carefully 
constructed government narrative of “traditional values” and 
moral sovereignty. For democracy to develop and endure, 
pluralism must continually challenge existing power 
relationships and expose inequality. Thus, accountability is key 
when it comes to pluralism in the public realm. However, constant 
accountability is unimaginable without freedom of expression and 
the voicing of dissenting opinions. Thus, in order to live up to its 
constitutional commitment to pluralism, it is key for Russia to 
develop a safe space for public discussion pertaining to 
government, governmental representatives and broader public 
policy issues, despite the conflicts that such discussion will 
generate. Artistic forms of protest alone, such as the one engaged 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term “democracy” is often used by various Russian 
officials, making it “a regular constituent of the government’s self-
representation.”1 However, since the early 2000s the Putin regime 
has insisted that democracy has to be “managed.”2 Such 
“management” has caused the suppression of information, 
dissenting opinions, and political representation in state 
institutions. Thus, “[c]reative forms of dissent, such as street theatre 
and performance art, joined the arsenal of protest weapons.”3 This 
article examines the Pussy Riot case from the 2012 trial decision to 
the 2018 challenge before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The case revolved around the “punk prayer” performed 
by three women in Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow. While 
the women asserted that their performance was a political act, 
Russian courts defined it as criminal hooliganism motivated by 
religious hatred under s.213 of the Russian Criminal Code. Pussy 
Riot’s members were convicted, and each sentenced to two years of 
imprisonment.  
While the Pussy Riot case, centering on violation of freedom of 
expression, may be framed as a matter of political speech vs. 
religious speech, its implications are much broader. Ultimately, the 
 
1 Anastasia Denisova, Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia After the 2011-
2012 Anti-Government Protests: Digital Media at Stake, 39 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC., 
977 (2016).  
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 979.  
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Pussy Riot performance and subsequent legal cases were about the 
ability of pluralism and dissent to counter the carefully constructed 
government narrative of “traditional values” and moral 
sovereignty. Accountability is key when it comes to pluralism in 
the public realm. However, constant accountability is 
unimaginable without freedom of expression and the voicing of 
dissenting opinions. Thus, in order to live up to its constitutional 
commitment to pluralism, it is key for Russia to develop a safe 
space for public discussion pertaining to government, government 
representatives, and broader public policy issues, despite the 
conflicts that this discussion will inevitably generate. Artistic forms 
of protest alone, such as the one engaged in by Pussy Riot, are not 
enough, as they currently fail to appeal and be accessible to larger 
Russian audiences.4 
Part I of this article examines why freedom of expression in 
general and political speech in particular are vital for democracy 
and considers the justifications for regulating hate speech. Part II 
looks at the idea of pluralism as vital for democracy, while also 
noting that due to the antagonistic nature of pluralism and the 
temporary nature of any type of consensus derived from public 
deliberations and multiple forms of expression, pluralist 
democracy by its nature is both dynamic and fragile. This part 
examines why, despite the seeming recognition of the importance 
of pluralism for democracy, the concepts of democracy and 
pluralism are increasingly being challenged in many places around 
the world. It illustrates how the Russian state, in addition to 
banishing pluralism from the political sphere, also engaged in a 
concerted effort of connecting human rights with morality, thus 
making rights unavailable to “sinners.” Part III of the article 
examines the challenges to pluralism posed by political and 
religious speech. It examines the 2012 Russian trial decision against 
the members of Pussy Riot, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence concerning 
political speech and religious speech and the ECtHR’s 2018 decision 
in the Pussy Riot case. The article concludes that pluralism and the 
conflict that it brings are considered threatening by nation states, as 
they put ideas into the public realm that compete with the official 
narrative. The Russian state’s current view is that pluralism is 
something that needs to be managed within a democracy, and that 
democracy needs to be based on satisfying the interests of the 
 
4 See id. at 979. 
2019 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 27:1 
 
majority and protecting Russian sovereignty from harmful foreign 
influences. Ultimately, what nations and institutions often fail to 
acknowledge is that the forces that assail pluralistic democracy are 
not foreign, but rather “internal to many, if not most, democratic 
nations . . . they are our own ideas and voices.”5 Therefore, the 
conflict is not so much an external one, between a foreign and a 
domestic view of human rights and dissent, but rather an internal 
one, “between people who are prepared to live with others who are 
different, on terms of equal respect, and those who seek the 
protection of homogeneity.”6  
PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DEMOCRACY 
In authoritarian regimes, a key concern raised by both domestic 
and international critics often revolves around suppression of or 
placement of excessive limits on freedom of expression. Freedom 
of expression is vital in ensuring the proper functioning of 
democracy, and “[i]n Western democratic theory, it is often 
considered to be the fundamental freedom upon which all other 
rights depend.”7 Processes of contestation and communication are 
believed to be indispensable to the development, reshaping and 
advancement of other norms and rights.8 In a democracy, it is 
crucial for all people to be able to participate in debating issues of 
public importance,9 and a properly functioning democracy is often 
measured by its tolerance of unpopular or provocative views.10 The 
role of constitutional courts is to ensure that “majoritarian 
lawgiving” aligns with “the foundational values that underlie the 
democratic order.”11 Thus, constitutional courts can limit rights in 
a democratic society when such limitations are justified. In other 
 
5 Martha Nussbaum, The Clash Within: Democracy and the Hindu Right, 9 J. HUM. 
DEV. 357, 374 (2008). 
6 Id. at 359. 
7 Keith Dubick, The Theoretical Foundation for Protecting Freedom of Expression, 13 
NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (1993). 
8 Frank A. Morrow, Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235, 235 
(1975). 
9 Dubick, supra note 7, at 13. 
10 Id. at 14. 
11 Jacob Weinrib, What Is the Purpose of Freedom of Expression? 67 U. TORONTO FAC. 
L. REV. 165, 173 (2009). 
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words, constitutional courts ensure that politics based on a 
majoritarian conception of democracy do not operate in dissonance 
with the democratic values that are “intrinsic to the constitutional 
order.”12 Given this purported fundamental connection between 
free speech, democracy and other fundamental rights, it is 
unsurprising that constitutional courts tend to grant the highest 
degree of protection to so-called political speech and regulate it 
only when the “strongest showing of harm” is displayed.13 
Engagement in political speech allows people to criticize existing 
legal arrangements and propose new ones. Without this ability to 
contribute to political speech, individuals would become mere 
“passive citizens” with no ability to influence their elected 
representatives.14 However, despite the emphasis on political 
speech doing “the work of democracy,” attempts to come up with 
a precise definition of what exactly constitutes political speech 
inevitably leads to disputes over whether the “excluded 
communication could be interpreted by someone else as 
‘political.’”15 Apart from conceptualizing speech pertaining to 
political matters as fundamentally different from speech dealing 
with purely personal or individual matters,16 the difficulties of 
definition stem from ideological considerations and thus persist.17  
In part, this preferencing of political over other forms of speech 
stems from identifying various key goals that freedom of 
expression is thought to promote in a democracy—promotion of 
self-government, preserving social stability, building 
accountability and increasing public confidence in the political 
system.18 If people are able to meaningfully participate in the 
 
12 Id. at 177. 
13 Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a 
Free Speech Principle, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 343, 358 (2010) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, 
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 123 (New York: The Free Press, 1993)); See 
id. at 347 (Political speech includes not only certain types of speech but can also 
include non-verbal communication and actions). 
14 Weinrib, supra note 11, at 180. 
15 Katharine Gelber, Freedom of Political Speech, Hate Speech and the Argument from 
Democracy: The Transformative Contribution of Capabilities Theory, 9 CONTEMP. POL. 
THEORY 304, 305, 307 (2010). 
16 Morrow, supra note 8, at 238. 
17 Gelber, supra note 15, at 308. 
18 Dubick, supra note 7, at 15. 
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political process and provide their input through the voicing of 
opinions, including dissenting ones, self-government is 
facilitated.19 Participation in the political process through various 
acts of speech should also drive people to accept political decisions 
that they do not necessarily agree with, thus preserving social 
stability.20 Moreover, close public scrutiny of elected officials and 
governmental policies promotes accountability of public officials to 
their constituencies.21 Overall, “[p]olitical legitimacy is more likely 
to be achieved in a society that tolerates divergent views from all of 
its members, and is responsive to them.”22 In other words, public 
discourse and debate legitimize governmental decision-making by 
shining a light on governmental decision-making processes23 and 
thus ensure the viability of the entire political system.24  
Given the supposed connection between free speech and the 
very processes of democratic legitimation, regulating hate speech 
makes sense, despite this speech often falling within the highly 
protected category of “political speech.” Hate speech is restricted 
in democratic societies because it:  
“impairs the ability of its targets to participate in the 
very processes of democratic legitimation that 
justify the protection of freedom of speech in the first 
place and which are required to enact democracy 
itself. [Hate speech] . . . produces inequalities in 
speech opportunities and tacitly supports the 
ongoing marginalization of some people from 
political opportunities.25  
Nussbaum has pointed out that the state, under certain 
circumstances, has a duty to act to ensure that individuals are able 
to achieve their individual capabilities and that a simple absence of 
 
19 Morrow, supra note 8, at 241. 
20 Dubick, supra note 7, at 16. 
21 Gelber, supra note 15, at 305. 
22 Dubick, supra note 7, at 17. 
23 Gelber, supra note 15, at 311. 
24 Morrow, supra note 8, at 239. 
25 Gelber, supra note 15, at 314. 
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“negative state action” is simply not enough.26 Hence, the 
extremely harmful nature of hate speech justifies its regulation in a 
democratic society, even when it also constitutes political speech.27 
However, regulating political hate speech is made complicated if 
the speakers are able “to couch their claims in language that seems 
acceptable, even though they may cause more harm with their 
words.”28 Thus, while more obvious and blatant instances of hate 
speech are commonly captured within regulatory frameworks, 
damaging hate rhetoric presented as “political” or “public policy” 
discourse can escape regulation despite arguably causing more 
damage.29 There exists a “general reluctance to legally regulate 
speech that may be harmful but is not expressed in an extreme 
way.”30 Thus, hateful views couched in civil language may be 
misidentified as political or academic debate and could not only 
offend the targeted group, but gain legitimacy and thus create a 
permanent barrier for such a group, perpetuating the group’s often 
already marginalized status.31  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PLURALISM 
Aside from the debates over what amounts to hate speech, how 
it is regulated and whether the preferencing of political speech is 
justifiable,32 the idea that in a democratic state political decisions 
should be reached through “a process of deliberation among free 
and equal citizens” remains a key rationale for protecting pluralism 
that may be achieved only through freedom of speech.33 The 
pluralistic political system aims to include as many divergent 
interests as possible without compromising the ability of the state 
 
26 Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 
9 FEMINIST ECONOMICS, NO. 2-3, 2003, at 39. 
27 Gelber, supra note 15, at 321. 
28 Sarah Sorial, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Problem of (Manufactured) Authority, 
29 CANADIAN J. L. AND SOC’Y 59, 60 (2014). 
29 Id. at 65 (quoting Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.R. 
467, ¶ 116 (Can.)). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 69. 
32 See Weinrib, supra note 11, at 177. 
33 Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agnostic Pluralism 1 (Institute for 
Advanced Studies, Vienna, Political Science Series Working Paper No. 72, 2000). 
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to attend to key projects.34 After all, self-government, social 
stability and accountability of public officials all depend on the 
plurality of views being expressed within the public realm. Thus, 
instead of trying to force upon everyone a certain “illusory 
consensus on the common good,” social stability and political 
participation are better assured through accounting for dissent and 
making compromises between divergent interests.35 Pluralism then 
is essential for democracy,36 as it grounds both authority and 
legitimacy in public reasoning.37 However, pluralism, so seemingly 
necessary in a democracy, also entails antagonism. Thus, a 
democracy that respects a plurality of values through a proper 
accounting of dissent “requires developing an approach, which 
places the question of power and antagonism at its very center.”38 
Pluralism entails not only recognition of power struggles, injustices 
and conflicts, but also their legitimation, rather than suppression 
by the imposition of an authoritarian order.39 In a pluralistic 
democracy: 
the constitutional state can neither display 
ambivalence about whether the injustices that it 
committed in the past actually occurred, nor can it 
idealize present conditions that fail to conform to 
constitutional norms. Ambivalence or idealization 
about past or present injustices would be 
inconsistent with the dignity of persons, who cannot 
be assured that past injustices will not recur and that 
present ones will be addressed if the state does not 
acknowledge its failings and hold itself, both in the 
 
34 William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1293 (2005).  
35 Mouffe, supra note 33, at 2. 
36 I.V. Nemkevich, “Konstitutsionnoe Zakreplenie Ideologicheskogo Pluralizma 
na Postsovetskom Prostranstve,” Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo Universiteta im. N.I. 
Lobachevskogo [Constitutional Consolidation of Ideological Pluralism in the Post-
Soviet Space] (2012) 1:1 at 272 (Russ.). 
37 Mouffe, supra note 33, at 4. 
38 Id. at 13. 
39 Id. at 16. 
2019 PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONFLICT WITHIN 9 
 
present and in the future, to a standard of conduct 
that harmonizes with its fundamental norms.40  
Thus pluralism, by its nature, is contentious, as it entails 
“politics as a process of contention among groups in society, while 
at the same time more explicit unmasking and questioning [of] the 
power dynamics behind pluralist group differentiation in the first 
place.”41 Hence, in a pluralistic democracy any sort of consensus 
becomes a “conflictual consensus,” which by its very nature is 
temporary. The democratic process becomes “precisely about 
managing tensions and the articulation of ‘precarious solutions.’”42 
If the goal, however, becomes reaching consensus and causes the 
suppression of dissent and confrontation, such an emphasis on the 
“common good,” “common values” or collective unanimity can 
lead to “apathy and disaffection with political engagement.”43 
Without a true commitment to pluralism, certain groups will 
disengage from political participation if they think such 
participation will never yield results that they perceive as 
important, or if they perceive an entire process as unduly 
burdensome or even threatening to their group identity.44 
Due to the antagonistic nature of pluralism and the temporary 
nature of any type of consensus derived from public deliberations 
and multiple forms of expression, pluralist democracy by its nature 
is both dynamic and fragile.45 However, pluralist democracy 
potentially engages the most stakeholders and diverse groups in 
governance, thus enriching democratic discourse.46 Dissenting 
views, besides creating antagonism and conflict, also challenge the 
prevailing consensus.47 Divergent views “can be a powerful tool 
 
40 Weinrib, supra note 11, at 175. 
41 John A. Guidry & Mark Q. Sawyer, Contentious Pluralism: The Public Sphere and 
Democracy, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 273, 277 (2003). 
42 Mouffe, supra note 33, at 9. 
43 Id. at 16. 
44 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1293. 
45 Id. at 1294. 
46 Id. at 1295. 
47 N.V. Konovalenko, Democratic Framework of the Freedom of Speech: Possibilities and 
Limitations, 1 PERSPECTIVES OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION 28 (2014) (Russ.). See also 
Alexandra V. Orlova, The Soft Power of Dissent: The Impact of Dissenting Opinions 
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when it comes to debate and democracy, precisely due to their 
capacity to show the availability of ‘multiple truths’ and keep the 
conversation open.”48 In a pluralist democracy, the majority is 
forced to bargain with minority interests.49 While marginalized 
groups attempt to claim space in the public sphere, elite groups 
frequently try to retain existing power dynamics and 
relationships.50 This process of constant bargaining requires 
continual conflict management.51 Despite this perpetual need to 
account for conflict, “contentious pluralism,” is in part realized 
through freedom of expression, and thought to be essential for 
democracy.52 In order for democracy to develop and endure, 
“contentious pluralism must continually subvert the relationships 
of power that emerge in public spheres.”53 
Many jurisdictions around the world have specifically written 
the commitment to pluralism directly into their constitutions.54 
Despite this seeming recognition of the importance of pluralism for 
democracy, the very concepts of democracy and pluralism are 
increasingly being challenged in many places around the world.55 
In part, this challenge derives from the gap between “democracy’s 
potential and its lived experience.”56 While elections are now 
commonplace, the key features of democracy, such as equality, 
freedom of speech, fairness and restraint are lacking in many 
nations.57 This weakening commitment to democracy and 
pluralism stems from many factors, such as the disastrous war in 
Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis and a broader desire to regain control 
 
from the Russian Constitutional Court, 52 VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 611 
(2019), forthcoming. 
48 Orlova, supra note 47, at 641. 
49 Eskridge Jr., supra note 34, at 1295. 
50 Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 273. 
51 Eskridge Jr., supra note 34, at 1295. 
52 Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 277. See also Anthony Downs, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, 65 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 135 (1957); ROBERT DAHL, WHO 
GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1974). 
53 Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 274.  
54 Nemkevich, supra note 36, at 272. 
55 John D. Whyte, Democracy in Decline: Steps in the Wrong Direction, 40 QUEEN’S 
L. REV. 787, 787 (2015) (book review). 
56 Guidry & Sawyer, supra note 41, at 274. 
57 Whyte, supra note 55, at 787. 
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due to the local impacts of globalization.58 As Anne Applebaum 
says, “People very much have the sense . . . that their politicians no 
longer control events. The ‘Leave’ campaign slogan in the Brexit 
referendum campaign was ‘Take Back Control.’”59 Russia is 
certainly not unique in its departure from democratic principles 
and values in general and pluralism and freedom of speech in 
particular. For example, on October 9, 2018, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta 
newspaper, the official governmental mouthpiece and the most 
widely circulated newspaper in Russia, published an article by V. 
Zorkin, Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court. In the 
article, Zorkin stated that the changes generated by globalization 
are not always beneficial and at times carry enormous risks and 
costs in various spheres of human life in many nations around the 
world.60 Thus, a desire to oppose these processes of globalization 
and resistance to universalization is felt in many jurisdictions. 
Zorkin stated that: 
[a]t the level of mass consciousness, this is 
manifested in the desire to formulate their religious, 
national, or regional (for example, European) 
identity, to preserve and strengthen the traditional 
values of the family, culture, life, etc. And at the 
level of public authorities, this is manifested in the 
desire to prevent the erosion of national state 
sovereignty and to solidify national constitutional 
identity.61 
 Zorkin further asserted that when it comes to public consensus 
pertaining to the content of human rights, this consensus is 
established by most of society and is established for the majority. 
Zorkin stated that he does not mean to say that the concept of 
constitutional identity is focused only on the protection of the rights 
 




60Valerii Zorkin, Bukva I duh Konstitutsii, [The Letter and the Spirit of the 
Constitution], ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.], (Oct. 9, 2018, 6:00 PM), 
https://rg.ru/2018/10/09/zorkin-nedostatki-v-konstitucii-mozhno-ustranit-
tochechnymi-izmeneniiami.html [https://perma.cc/6MAG-Q9J4] (Russ.). 
61 Id. 
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of the majority. However, he did state that the rights of minorities 
could be protected only to the extent that the majority agrees. 
Zorkin emphasized, “it is impossible to impose on society a 
legislative norm that denies or calls into question the basic values 
of the common good shared by the majority of the country’s 
population.”62 It is clear that the solidification of Russian national 
constitutional identity through the emphasis on majoritarian 
consensus constitutes a clear challenge to the value of pluralism. 
Pluralism is portrayed not as a stabilizing societal element that 
creates greater governmental transparency and accountability as 
well as greater access to the political process, but instead as 
destabilizing and even threatening to national security.63 While the 
commitment to pluralism and free speech have been specifically 
written into Articles 13 and 29 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation,64 the Russian state has a long history of suppressing 
dissent and minority rights.65 The “aggressive minority” has been 
blamed for trying to undermine Russia politically, economically 
and socially.66 Thus, the current government perceives freedom 
(including freedom of speech) as something that needs to be 
carefully managed, because “if freedom is not ‘managed’ people 
[meaning the majority] will suffer.”67 It is asserted that too much 
information that is not properly controlled and managed by the 
state can cause “system overdose” and eventual loss of confidence 
in the system.68 Therefore, the government engaged in a deliberate 
 
62 Id. 
63 DAPHNE SKILLEN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN RUSSIA: POLITICS AND MEDIA FROM 
GORBACHEV TO PUTIN 321 (Richard Sakwa et al. eds., 2016). 
64 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF][Constitution] art. 13, 29 
(Russ.)(Article 13 reads as (1) Ideological plurality is recognized in the Russian 
Federation and (2) No ideology may be established as the state or obligatory 
ideology. Article 29 reads as (1) Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of 
thought and speech). 
65 V.A. Kochev and A.B. Ektumaev, Pravo na svobodu slova kak osnovnoe pravo [The 
Right to Freedom of Speech as a Fundamental Right], PERM U. HERALD JURID. SCI. 
134 (2017) (Russ); Alikhan Beslanovich Ektumaev, Predely I Granitsy Prava na 
Svobudu Slova [Metes and Bounds of the Freedom of Expression], Perm U. (2017) 
(Russ). 
66 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 320 
67 Id. at 322. 
68 A.V. Rossoshanskiy, Infortatsionnyi Suverenitet I Svoboda Slova v Kontekste 
Politicheskoi Modernizatsii v Sovremennoi Rossii [Information Sovereignty and 
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effort to create so-called “information sovereignty”69 by 
eliminating pluralism and dissenting viewpoints from the 
mainstream.70 Loss of this “information sovereignty” is perceived 
to be dangerous, and governmental control over most information 
channels is equated with people’s trust in the ability of the 
government to sort out what information is socially useful for the 
Russian society.71 Thus, controlling information flows is perceived 
as key to ensuring security and political sovereignty.72  
Because of the deliberate attacks on alternative viewpoints, 
especially after the 2011–12 public protests against the violation of 
voting procedures during the Russian presidential election, dissent 
has been practically removed from the political sphere.73 The Putin 
regime viewed the election protests as an attempt by the West to 
effect regime change in Russia, using political dissenters to achieve 
this goal.74 Hence, in the aftermath of these protests the regime 
undertook several measures to suppress political dissent. Examples 
of suppression include the July 2012 federal law that forces 
nongovernmental organizations that accept any sort of foreign 
funding to register as “foreign agents” and to provide reports of 
their activities every six months.75 In the same month, defamation 
was reintroduced as an offence in the Russian Criminal Code, 
making it easier to control the media through the charge of making 
 
Freedom of Speech within the Context of Political Modernization in 
Contemporary Russia], 1 Irkutsk St. U., 19, 22 (2012) (Russ.). 
69 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 333. 
70 Id. at 326. 
71 Rossoshanskii, supra note 68, at 23. 
72 Id. at 326. 
73 Pavel Romanov & Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, “Foreign Agents” in the Field of Social 
Policy Research: The Demise of Civil Liberties and Academic Freedom in Contemporary 
Russia, 25:4 J. OF EUR. SOC. POL’Y 361, 362 (2015). 
74 See Ellen Barry, Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-
moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html). 
75 О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской 
Федерации в части регулирования деятельности некоммерческих 
организаций, выполняющих функции иностранного агента [On 
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the 
Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the 
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 20, 2012.  
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defamatory public statements.76 In June 2012, harsher 
administrative penalties were introduced for violations during 
public rallies.77 Moreover, Russian law requires permission from 
authorities for public gatherings involving more than one person 
expressing an opinion.78 The government also passed federal 
legislation aimed to suppress so-called “gay propaganda” directed 
at children79 in an effort to promote “traditional values.” In June 
2013, in response to the feminist punk group Pussy Riot’s 
performance at Christ the Saviour Cathedral, section 148 (Violation 
of the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion) of the Russian 
Criminal Code was amended to criminalize “public action 
expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to 
insult the religious feelings of believers”80 and a punishment of up 
to three years imprisonment was set if the offence was aggravated 
by “its commission in places designed for religious services, 
religious rites and ceremonies.”81 After the 2014 annexation of 
Crimea and the resulting conflict with Ukraine, the Russian 
political establishment perceived themselves to be engaged in an 
“information war” with both Ukraine and the West.82 Hence, any 
 
76 О внесении изменений в Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации и 
отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации [On Amendments 
to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ,] 
July 28, 2012. 
77 Alexandra V. Orlova, Challenging Everyday Violence of the State: Developing 
Sustained Opposition Movements through Anti-Corruption Protests, RESEARCH IN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE (181) (Patrick G. Coy eds. 2018). 
78 Federal’nyi Zakon RF O Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Federal'nyy zakon “O 
Sobraniyakh, Mitingakh, Demonstratsiyakh, Mitingakh i Piketakh” [On 
Amendments to the Federal Law “On Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, 
Rallies and Pickets.”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] June 8, 2012. 
79 Federal’nyi Zakon RF V Tselyakh Zashchity Detey ot Informatsii, 
Vystupayushchey za Otritsaniye Traditsionnykh Semeynykh Tsennostey [For the 
Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of 
Traditional Family Values], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] June 30, 2013. 
80 Online and On All Fronts: Russia’s Assault on Freedom of Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (July 18, 2017), https://www.hrpw.org/report/2017/07/18/online-and-
all-fronts/russias-assault-freedom-expression. 
81 Gleb Bogush, Criminalisation of Free Speech in Russia, 69 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 
1242, 1246 (2017). 
82 S.N. Ilchenko, Politicheskaya Iznanka Shou-Tsivilizatsii: Illuzii Svobody Slova I 
Informatsonnaya Voina, [The Political Inside Out of Show of Civilization: Illusions 
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viewpoints that were critical of the government’s Ukraine policy 
were equated with the “systematic and mass [media] attack by the 
enemy” and had to be dealt with.83 Clearly, the government felt an 
urgent need to control freedom of expression, as it was viewed as 
“fuel” for other acts designed to destabilize Russia.84  
 In addition to banishing pluralism from the political sphere, 
the government also engaged in a concerted effort of connecting 
human rights with morality, making rights unavailable to 
“sinners”85 and thus neglecting the moral pluralism of human 
rights.86 The government engaged in a deliberate campaign of 
defining human rights in accordance with Russian “traditional 
values” as a way to subordinate democracy and pluralism to 
sovereignty87 and to portray criticism of the government as 
unpatriotic, dangerous and designed to weaken Russia.88 Instead 
of the content of human rights being determined in a pluralistic 
manner, human rights became deliberately associated with certain 
moral discourses.89 Hence, human rights are increasingly discussed 
as subject to local norms, rather than as universal.90 Asserting the 
“Russianness” of human rights became a way to resist Western 
values and those who support them by defining them as “un-
 
of Freedom of Speech And Information War], KOMUNIKATIVNYE ISSLEDOVANIYA at 
19. (Russ.) (2014). 
83 Id. at 21. 
84 I. M. Kunov, O Sisteme Ogranichenii Svobody Slova po Rossiiskomu Ugolovnomu 
Zakonodatelstvu, [About the System of Restrictions on Freedom of Speech under 
the Russian Criminal Legislation], VESTNIK KRASNODARSKOGO UNIVERSITETA MVD 
ROSSII at 72. (Russ.) (2016). 
85 Alexandra V. Orlova, Privatizing Homosexuality: Russia’s Reassertion of ‘Moral 
Sovereignty’ Over Gay Rights, 11:2 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 122, 129, 138 
(2017). 
86 John M. Alexander, Capabilities, Human Rights and Moral Pluralism, 8:4 INT’L J. OF 
HUM. RTS. 451, 461 (2004). 
87 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 25. The Russian government argues for the traditional 
idea of sovereignty and argues against the transformation of sovereignty that 
would include some decision-making capabilities residing in transnational 
entities; See Julian Culp, Internationalizing Nussbaum’s Model of Cosmopolitan 
Democratic Education, 13:2 ETHICS & EDUC. 172, 178 (2018). 
88 Bogush, supra note 81, at 1255. 
89 Jay Drydyk, Responsible Pluralism, Capabilities, and Human Rights, 12:1 J. OF HUM. 
DEV. & CAPABILITIES 39, 40, 59 (2011). 
90 Larry Alexander, Is Freedom of Expression a Universal Right?, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
707, 715 (2013). 
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Russian.”91 The emphasis on so-called “traditional values” was 
explained by a need to maintain a firm connection to Russia’s 
culture and history.92 Moreover, proponents of viewpoints that 
oppose regime’s policies have been presented as extremists and 
traitors and subjected to criminal and administrative law sanctions, 
thus rendering many important political and social issues beyond 
the scope of acceptable debate.93 Furthermore, in 2015 the Russian 
Parliament passed legislation enabling the Russian Constitutional 
Court to declare rulings of international human rights tribunals 
(such as the European Court of Human Rights) to be “non-
executable,” if such rulings were not reconcilable with the Russian 
Constitution.94 The Russian Constitutional Court has so far 
declared that two of the Strasbourg Court’s rulings could not be 
executed.95 Thus, the judiciary has contributed to government 
efforts to shrink the space for public debate and pluralism.96 
Human rights, including freedom of expression, have become 
“hostage” to the regime’s interests and limitations have been 
increasingly justified by security and morality concerns.97  
In his 2019 state of the union address to the Federal Assembly, 
Putin reiterated Russia’s continued commitment to “traditional 
values,” due to Russia’s identity being “rooted in centuries-long 
 
91 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 24. 
92 Rossoshanskii, supra note 68, at 21. 
93 Bogush, supra note 81, at 1255. 
94 Alexandra V. Orlova, Sovereignty, Dissent, and the Shaping of International 
Consensus Around Human Rights: An Examination of Russian ‘Disengagement’ from the 
European Court of Human Rights, 35:3 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 436, 456 (2018). 
95 See Anchugov i Gladkov protiv Rossii 19 aprelya 2016 g. [Anchugov and Gladkov 
v. Russia], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] May 5, 2016; see also YUKOS protiv 
Rossii 19 yanvarya 2017 g. [Yukos v. Russia], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Feb. 
3, 2017. 
96 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 80. 
97 Vladimir Ryzhkov, “Russia’s New Totalitarianism Depends on Silence,” The 
Moscow Times, April 23, 2015; I. I. Barysheva, “Nekotorye Problemy Opredeleniya 
Predelov Ugolovno-Pravovogo Ogranicheniya Svobody Slova Dlya Zaschity 
Interesov Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti,” [Some Problems of Defining the Limits 
of Criminal Law Restrictions on Freedom of Speech to Protect Public Security 
Interests], Probely v Rossiiskom Zakonodatelstve (2008) 1 at 226, 227 (Russ.). Vladimir 
Ryzhkov, Russia’s New Totalitarianism Depends on Silence, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 
23, 2015; Probely v Rossiiskom Zakonodatelstve (2008) 1 at 226, 227 (Russ.). 
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traditions and the culture of our people, our values and customs.”98 
Putin also criticized Western (particularly US) “exceptionalism” 
and “supremacy” and stated that Russia cannot survive as a state 
without maintaining its sovereignty.99 However, the current 
Russian regime arguably is itself pursuing a policy of 
exceptionalism on numerous fronts. In this new Russian 
exceptionalism, loyalty is conflated with patriotism, the contours of 
human rights are determined domestically and dissent and 
pluralism in political and legal thought is presented as “Western 
colonialism”100 that needs to be defended against.101 This new 
Russian identity is fiercely protected by the current regime by its 
maintaining “information sovereignty”102 that rejects protest, 
dissent and criticism. The regime portrays itself as a “champion of 
genuine, traditional European values against their perceived 
degeneracy in ‘Gayropa.’”103 In a sense, Western (particularly 
European) “detraditionalization”104 and the secular tradition of 
human rights is constantly juxtaposed against Russian “traditional 
values,” steeped in moral and religious principles. 
The Russian Constitutional Court has contributed to the 
construction and maintenance of “information sovereignty” by 
“hollowing out” various rights in upholding the constitutionality 
of governmental provisions designed to stifle dissent.105 While 
 
98 Vladimir Putin: Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, KREMLIN WEBSITE 
(Feb. 20, 2019), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863 (visited June 
2019). 
99 Id. 
100 See Orlova, supra note 85, at 140. 
101 Mark Galeotti & Andrew S. Bowen, Putin’s Empire of the Mind: How Russia’s 
President Morphed from Realist to Ideologue – and What He’ll Do Next, FOREIGN POLICY 
(April 21, 2014, 9:50 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/21/putins-empire-
of-the-mind/. 
102 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 333. 
103 Kevork K. Oskanian, A Very Ambiguous Empire: Russia’s Hybrid Exceptionalism, 
70:1 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 43 (2018). 
104 Zachary R. Calo, Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights, 
26 J. L. & RELIGION 269 (2010). 
105 See Judgment of 23rd September, 2014 No. 24-П/2014 on the case concerning 
the review of constitutionality of Section 1 of Article 6.21 of the Administrative 
Offences Code of the Russian Federation in connection with the complaint of 
N.A.Alexeev, Ya.N.Yevtushenko and D.A.Isakov, The Constitutional court of the 
Russian Federation, 2014, No. 2, Item П/2014 (upholding the constitutionality of 
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constitutional rights can be limited in some cases, such limitations 
must be necessary in a democratic society.106 In other words, rights 
cannot be limited to such an extent that they would lose their 
substance, becoming a mere formality and thus irrelevant.107 The 
very concept of self-governance, guaranteed to Russian citizens by 
Article 32108 of the Russian Constitution, is inextricably connected 
to the freedom of expression and pluralism also constitutionally 
guaranteed in Articles 13 and 29. Hence, the stifling of freedom of 
expression and pluralism has a direct impact on the quality of 
dialogue between the state and civil society, thus directly impacting 
self-governance and democracy.109 
However, as protest and dissent are suppressed in the political 
sphere (with suppression sanctioned by the legal recognition of the 
constitutionality of limitations), they spread into the artistic 
community, which has “always played an oppositionist role in 
Russian and Soviet society.”110 A certain “carnivalisation” of 
protest is occurring as it becomes increasingly hard for people to 
express dissent, forcing inventive forms of protest to emerge.111 The 
“punk prayer” performance by the women of Pussy Riot in Christ 
 
the federal “anti-gay” legislation); see also Judgment of 8 April, 2014 No.10-П/2014 
on the case concerning the review of constitutionality of the provisions of Item 6 
of Article 2 and Item 7 of Article 32 of the Federal Law “On Non- Commercial 
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V.P.Yukechev, 2014, No. 10, Item П/2014 (upholding the constitutionality of the 
federal Foreign Agents Law).  
106 M.V. Solomina, Svoboda Slova Kak Pravovaya I Politicheskaya Kategoriya, [Freedom 
of Speech as a Legal and Political Category] Vestnik Omskogo Universiteta (2008) 
3:16 at 159 (Russ.); Ektumaev, supra note 65; Kochev, supra note 65. 
107 Ektumaev, supra note 65. 
108 Article 32 of the Russian Constitution reads as: “1. Citizens of the Russian 
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109 See M.A. Lipchanskaya and M.E Rubanova, Spetsifika Realizatsii Svobody Slova v 
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Realization of Freedom of Speech as a Form of Constitutional Constructive 
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104 (2017) (Russ.). 
110 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 3. 
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the Saviour Cathedral was precisely the type of artistic protest that 
attempts to inject a dose of dissent into the current Russian political 
discourse and challenge the carefully constructed status quo. 
POLITICAL SPEECH VS. RELIGIOUS SPEECH 
A. Pussy Riot Trial Decision (2012) 
On February 21, 2012, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria 
Alekhina and Yekaterina Samutsevich entered Christ the Saviour 
Cathedral in Moscow. They dumped their backpacks in a pile and 
took off their coats to reveal short, brightly coloured dresses. They 
proceeded to put balaclavas on their faces, walked to the iconostasis 
and altar, plugged in an amplifier for an electric guitar and began 
singing and dancing. During the court hearing there was 
disagreement about the lyrics. The accused women claimed that 
they said, “Holy Mother, drive out Putin” and “Holy Mother, 
become a feminist.” The prosecution witnesses claimed that the 
women cursed and insulted God and the Church.112 The three 
women were charged with criminal hooliganism motivated by 
religious hatred under s.213 of the Russian Criminal Code. On 
August 17, 2012 they were convicted and each sentenced to two 
years of imprisonment.113 During their trial, the women argued 
that they were not motivated by religious hatred, but were instead 
trying to mount a political protest in an artistic form.114 Their main 
complaints included the suppression of dissent by the Russian 
state, anti-gay propaganda laws and the inappropriate support of 
the Church for Putin’s presidency.115 The trial judge, however, 
refused to examine the political aspect of the case and instead 
focused entirely on the blasphemous nature of the women’s 
conduct.116 The judge stated: 
 
112See “Prigovor Pussy Riot” for full text of the decision: 
https://snob.ru/selected/entry/51999 (accessed April 2018) (Russ.). 
113 Id. 
114 Alexandra V. Orlova, Russian Politics of Masculinity and the Decay of Feminism: 
The Role of Dissent in Creating New ‘Local Norms’, 25 WM. & MARY J. OF RACE, GENDER 
& SOC. JUST. 59, 68 (2018). 
115 See “Prigovor Pussy Riot,” supra note 112. 
116 SKILLEN, supra note 63, at 28. 
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The position taken by the defendants that all actions 
in the Cathedral were not motivated by hatred and 
enmity towards Christian believers and the 
Orthodoxy, but were performed for political 
reasons, is untenable, due to the fact that, as 
evidenced by the witnesses’ testimony, when 
committing this hooliganism act, the defendants 
made no political statements and did not mention 
any names of politicians.117  
It is clear that the trial court took an exceptionally narrow view 
of what constitutes “political speech” by limiting it to specific 
political statements and calling out names of specific politicians.118 
The Court also did not specify what exact conduct of the women 
amounted to religious hatred,119 but based its conclusions of the 
religiously offensive and hateful nature of the women’s speech 
entirely on witness testimony120 and the impact of the performance 
on “the religious considerations of the general public.”121 In other 
words, the court did not give serious consideration to the intent 
behind Pussy Riot’s performance.122 In 2014, the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation123 proclaimed that § 213 of the 
Russian Criminal Code was not vague and was thus 
constitutional.124 Moreover, the Constitutional Court stated that 
domestic courts, when applying s.213, need to take account of the 
historical and cultural traditions of the Russian people as well as 
 
117 See Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 112. 
118 Volha Kananovich, “‘Execute Not Pardon’: The Pussy Riot Case, Political Speech, 
and Blasphemy in Russian Law,” 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 343, 412 (2015). 
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Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossijskoj Federacii [about the refusal to accept for 
consideration the complaint of citizen Tolokonnikova Nadezhda Andreevna about 
the violation of her constitutional rights by the second part of Article 213 of the 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Sept. 
25, 2014. 
124 Id.  
2019 PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONFLICT WITHIN 21 
 
current social behavior norms when determining whether 
hooliganism motivated by religious hatred took place.125 Therefore, 
the Constitutional Court reinforced the importance of “traditional 
values” and majoritarian consensus being closely associated with 
religion and morality. 
Thus, focus on the religious aspects of Pussy Riot’s speech is 
unsurprising. On the one hand, this focus was meant to dismiss the 
women as immoral sinners subscribing to Western ideals of 
feminism126 and thus not deserving of protection. On the other 
hand, the choice to focus on the religious nature of their speech was 
a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the larger margin of 
appreciation set by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in religious speech jurisprudence, given the high-profile nature of 
the Pussy Riot case and the likely challenge in the Strasbourg Court.  
B. ECtHR’s Political Speech Jurisprudence 
Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) guarantees the right to freedom of expression.127 However, 
this right is not unlimited; Article 10(2) allows national 
governments to limit freedom of expression to achieve a number of 
aims, such as national security, territorial integrity, public safety, 
prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals and 
so on. However, Article 10(2) prescribes a three-part test that must 
be satisfied by any governmental restriction to be held valid by the 
court. Restrictions or limits on freedom of expression must (1) be 
prescribed by law; (2) pursue a legitimate aim from the list of aims 
in Article 10(2); and (3) be necessary in a democratic society.128 One 
of the key elements of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence over the years has 
been “the emphasis on the freedom of public, and particularly, 
 
125 Id. 
126 Orlova, supra note 114, at 70. 
127 “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 10, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 
128 Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (1979). 
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political debate.”129 The ECtHR stated that “[i]n a democratic 
system the actions or omissions of the government must be subject 
to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial 
authorities but also of the press and public opinion.”130 The very 
high level of protection around political speech clearly indicates 
that the ECtHR has placed priority on transparency when it comes 
to matters of public interest in a democratic society.131 In other 
words, the reason political speech gets such strong constitutional 
protection is because it is viewed as essential to democratic self-
governance.132 The ECtHR indicated in several cases that in a 
democratic society public authorities should expect to be under 
constant scrutiny by their citizens.133 The Court attached particular 
importance to pluralism, dissent and tolerance. The ECtHR 
emphasized that:  
Although individual interests can on occasion be 
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does 
not simply mean that the views of the majority 
should always prevail: a balance must be achieved 
that ensures the fair and proper treatment of 
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant 
position.134  
The ECtHR interpreted what amounts to “political speech” 
broadly.135 The Strasbourg Court placed “criticism of elected 
officials,”136 public commentary on public authorities and 
governance issues137 as well as statements on matters of public 
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31276/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
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concern138 into the category of “political speech.” Overall, the 
ECtHR engages in proportionality analysis to examine whether any 
particular limitation is necessary in a democratic society,139 in 
which the Court examines whether the nature and severity of the 
limitation imposed on freedom of expression is proportional to the 
purpose that the government is aiming to accomplish. In cases of 
political speech, applying the proportionality test by the ECtHR has 
dramatically reduced the member states’ margin of appreciation of 
what can be considered an appropriate limitation on freedom of 
expression.140 
C. ECtHR Religious Speech Jurisprudence 
 While the ECtHR has left member states very little room to 
maneuver in dealing with limitations on political speech, in 
religious speech cases the Strasbourg Court’s rulings have given 
member states a wider margin of appreciation. When it comes to 
forms of expression critical of religion falling under Article 10 of the 
ECHR, it seems that the ECtHR has treated journalistic or scholarly 
criticisms more favorably than the creative or artistic types of 
critiques.141 This disparity in treatment stems from the 
“gratuitously offensive” test set by the ECtHR in the Otto-Preminger 
Institut v. Austria.142 The ECtHR held that the Austrian authorities 
were justified in seizing and forfeiting a religiously satirical film 
that presented an unflattering depiction of the Christian God, Jesus 
Christ, and the Virgin Mary as well as showing them colluding with 
the Devil.143 The intervention by the Austrian authorities were “to 
prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their 
religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner,” given 
that Austria’s population is mostly Roman Catholic.144 In the 
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subsequent cases of Wingrove145 and IA,146 the ECtHR followed the 
“gratuitously offensive” test set out in Otto-Preminger Institut 
pointing to the “voyeuristic”147 or “abusive”148 nature of the 
suppressed materials, noting that the materials lacked permissible 
“provocative opinion.”149 In the Wingrove decision, the ECtHR 
relied on the lack of the European consensus when it comes to 
blasphemy law. Hence, the Court concluded that there was no 
sufficient uniformity in European practice to draw a conclusion 
that the offence of blasphemy was not necessary in a democratic 
society.150 In both cases, the materials in question were artistic in 
nature–a video and a novel. In the Murphy v. Ireland151 decision, the 
ECtHR clearly struggled to reconcile the idea of pluralism as an 
essential element of democracy with keeping religious peace. The 
case centered on a ban on all religious advertising contained in the 
Irish Radio and Television Act of 1988.152 The ECtHR noted “that 
the concepts of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness on 
which any democratic society is based mean that Article 10 does 
not, as such, envisage that an individual is to be protected from 
exposure to a religious view simply because it is not his or her 
own.”153 However, the Court noted that “a wider margin of 
appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when 
regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to 
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals 
or, especially, religion.”154 
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On the other hand, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 in 
the Giniewski155 and Klein156 cases, both dealing with publication of 
provocative newspaper articles. In Giniewski, the ECtHR had to deal 
with the legality of the defamation proceedings brought against the 
writer of a newspaper article that discussed the role of the Roman 
Catholic doctrine of fulfilment and its contribution to anti-Semitism 
and the Holocaust.157 The ECtHR concluded that Article 10 was 
violated since the “applicant’s statements contribute to a recurrent 
debate of ideas between historians, theologians and religious 
authorities.”158 The Court concluded that the article contributed to 
the issue of public interest in a democratic society and thus was not 
“gratuitous or detached from the reality of contemporary 
thought.”159 Similarly, in the Klein case the Court held that the 
criminal conviction of a writer of an article that criticized the 
Slovakian Archbishop for his role in undermining the separation of 
Church and State160 constituted a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR.161 The Court stated that the “applicant’s strongly worded 
pejorative opinion related exclusively to the person of a high 
representative of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Contrary to the 
domestic court’s findings, the Court is not persuaded that by these 
statements the applicant discredited and disparaged a sector of the 
population on account of their Catholic faith.”162 
 Finally, in a recent decision of the ECtHR in ES v. Austria,163 
the Court strongly reaffirmed the “gratuitously offensive” test for 
religiously offensive speech set out in Otto-Preminger. The case 
dealt with the challenge to a criminal conviction of an applicant 
under Article 188 of the Austrian Criminal Code for the offence of 
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disparaging religious doctrines.164 The applicant asserted that her 
Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression was violated.165 The 
applicant had given several publicly advertised seminars titled 
“Basic Information on Islam” at the right-wing Freedom Party 
Education Institute.166 In these seminars, she described the Prophet 
Mohammad as having pedophilic tendencies due to his marriage 
with Aisha when she was six years old.167 The ECtHR held that 
applicant’s criminal conviction served the legitimate government 
aim of protecting religious peace168 and reiterated that the exercise 
of the freedom of expression carried with it certain duties and 
responsibilities, “including a duty to avoid as far as possible an 
expression that is, in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously 
offensive to others and profane.”169 The ECtHR concluded that 
there existed a wide margin of appreciation in this case due to the 
sensitivity of the statements made by the applicant.170 The Court 
concluded that “the applicant’s statements had been capable of 
arousing justified indignation” and that “they had not been made 
in an objective manner aiming at contributing to a debate of public 
interest.”171 Thus, the applicant’s criminal conviction did not 
violate Article 10 of the ECHR.172 The Court then rejected the 
applicant’s assertion that her attack on the Prophet Mohammad 
had to be tolerated because it formed part of “a lively 
discussion.”173 
It is clear that the most recent decision of the ECtHR in the ES 
v. Austria case reaffirmed the approach taken in the Otto-Preminger 
Institut decision, reiterating the “gratuitously offensive” test for 
limitations placed on religious speech. The approach to religious 
speech taken by the ECtHR has been criticized on a number of 
fronts. For instance, it was argued that the Otto-Preminger Institut 
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case that set out the “gratuitously offensive” test was too focused 
on “majoritarian sentiments in Austria,” emphasizing that 
Austria’s population is primarily composed of Roman Catholics.174 
However, some might argue that if the overwhelming majority of 
the population are Roman Catholics, then a shocking religious 
assertion is unlikely to seriously undermine individual religious 
rights.175 Similarly, in I.A. v. Turkey, the ECtHR also considered the 
demographic argument and that many active Muslim believers in 
Turkey would be disturbed by provocative statements on Islam.176 
Arguably, the ECtHR failed to identify any significant harm to 
believers who were the dominant majority beyond the possibility 
of offence flowing from the limited advertising and public 
discussion of the provocative materials.177 Moreover, it has been 
argued that the key problem with the “gratuitously offensive” test 
is that international human rights law does not recognize the right 
to have individual religious beliefs spared from criticism or even 
ridicule or insult. In other words, there is no right in international 
law “to have one’s religious feelings respected.”178 Thus, decisions 
by the ECtHR regarding religiously offensive speech have faced 
criticism for supposedly “introducing into the Convention a new 
right not to be offended.”179 The standard for member states to be 
able to limit rights—“serious offen[ce] [to] the deeply held feelings 
of [believers]”—is very vague and prone to expansive 
interpretation.180 A better approach to justify restricting freedom of 
expression is to focus on verbal or written attacks on religious 
groups that “reach the level of inciting hatred and violence.”181 
Even this approach would require the state to demonstrate a 
pressing social need to restrict such religious speech.182  
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D. The ECtHR’s Pussy Riot Decision (2018) 
Clearly, when it comes to resolving a conflict between freedom 
of expression and freedom of religion, which have equal status in 
the ECHR, the ECtHR favored “protecting religious sensibilities, 
even in spite of the criticism of legal scholars and even the CoE’s 
[Council of Europe] own advisory bodies,” particularly when 
dealing with artistic or creative expression.183 Hence, in light of the 
ECtHR’s differences in approach to political and religious speech, 
the decision by the Russian trial court in the Pussy Riot case—to 
frame the conduct of the accused as religiously offensive speech—
was clearly a strategic decision, especially given the ECtHR 
“gratuitously offensive” test for offensive religious speech and 
considerations of impact on the dominant religious majority. While 
Article 14 of the Russian Constitution states that the “Russian 
Federation shall be a secular state,” throughout Putin’s rule Russian 
Orthodoxy has been synthesized with Russian national identity 
through the emphasis on “traditional values.”184 Thus, the 
reframing of the issues from political speech to religious speech 
during the Pussy Riot trial was unsurprising, given the 
government’s overall emphasis on “traditional values” and 
Russian identity distinct from the West, as well as the ECtHR’s 
inconsistent rulings regarding religious speech and a wider margin 
of appreciation available to member states. It was clear from the 
high-profile nature of the trial that the Pussy Riot case was headed 
for the ECtHR. In turn, the ECtHR’s decision in the case hinged in 
large part on the Court’s classification of whether Pussy Riot’s 
speech was religious or political. If the speech were to be classified 
as religious, then an argument could be mounted that the 
restrictions and even criminal punishment of Pussy Riot’s conduct 
was necessary in order to protect public safety by safeguarding “the 
large community of Russian Orthodox believers from insulting 
their feelings, and preventing incitement of religious hatred and 
interpersonal conflicts on religious grounds.”185  
 At the ECtHR the applicants complained that the criminal 
proceedings against them and their subsequent detention and 
conviction for their “punk prayer” performance violated Article 10 
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of the ECHR.186 The Russian government asserted that the 
applicants’ conviction for hooliganism was not due to them 
expressing their opinions, but rather because they had committed 
an offence punishable by the Russian Criminal Code.187 If there had 
been an interference with the applicants Article 10 rights, then such 
an interference had been “in accordance with the law.”188 The 
government claimed it had a legitimate aim in interfering with the 
applicants’ rights as it “sought to protect Orthodox Christians’ right 
to freedom of religion.”189 Furthermore, the interference was 
proportional and necessary in a democratic society “in order to 
safeguard the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention.”190 
Not surprisingly, the Russian government went on to rely on the 
Otto-Preminger Institut case to argue that the applicants had “an 
obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are 
gratuitously offensive to others and thus infringement of their 
rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public 
debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.”191 
Therefore, the actions of the applicant in a place of religious 
worship were targeting Christians who worked in or visited the 
cathedral and “had undermined tolerance.”192 The government 
asserted that the applicants were not being punished for their ideas 
or opinions, but rather for the form in which they chose to impart 
those opinions.193 The government stated that “the Court should 
consider the context and not the content of their speech.”194 In the 
government’s view, “the applicants’ conduct could not ‘contribute 
to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in 
human affairs’ and had merely been a provocative act and public 
disturbance, which had constituted an unjustified encroachment on 
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others’ freedom of religion.”195 While the Russian government’s 
framing of the applicants’ actions as religious speech and its 
reliance on the Otto-Preminger Institut’s “gratuitously offensive” 
test is not surprising, the government’s insistence that only the 
context, rather than the content, of the applicants’ speech should be 
considered is clearly at odds with the Otto-Preminger Institut and 
the more recent ES v. Austria line of cases, where content was 
clearly highly relevant. 
 The applicants maintained that their Article 10 rights were 
violated when they were prosecuted for their performance.196 The 
applicants argued that Russian domestic courts failed either to 
acknowledge their explicitly political message or to assess the 
proportionality of their performance’s interference with freedom of 
religion.197 The applicants argued that they chose the venue of their 
performance for political reasons, since the Patriarch of the Russian 
Orthodox Church had utilized the cathedral for a political 
speech.198 The applicants further noted that their song criticized 
public and religious officials for their exercise of their official 
functions.199 The applicants argued that “political speech enjoyed 
the highest level of protection under the Convention as being of 
paramount importance in a democratic society.”200 The applicants’ 
submissions were clearly meant to frame this case in terms of 
interference with political speech, which enjoys the highest level of 
protection. 
 The ECtHR commenced its analysis of the case by 
emphasizing that freedom of expression constitutes “one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society.”201 It is applicable not 
only to favourable, inoffensive or neutral ideas and information, 
but also to those ideas and information that “shock or disturb; such 
are the demand of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, 
without which there is no ‘democratic society.’”202 Article 10 
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protects both the substance, and, the form, in which the ideas and 
information are conveyed.203 However, freedom of expression is 
not an unlimited right and is subject to exceptions; but these must 
be strictly construed.204 In order for governmental interference to 
be justified under Article 10, it must be “prescribed by law,” pursue 
a legitimate aim from the purposes listed in Article 10(2) and be 
necessary in a democratic society, which requires a proportionality 
analysis.205 The ECtHR further noted that in assessing the 
proportionality of governmental interference with the freedom of 
expression, the Court will consider “the nature and severity of the 
penalty imposed.”206 
 The ECtHR described the applicants’ performance as a mix 
of conduct and verbal expression that amounted to a form “of 
artistic and political expression covered by Article 10.”207 It is clear 
that from the very beginning the ECtHR framed this case as one of 
political speech, deserving the highest level of protection, thus 
reducing the Russian state’s margin of appreciation. The ECtHR 
noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicants as well 
as their subsequent prison sentence constituted an interference 
with their right to freedom of expression.208 The Court chose not to 
focus its analysis on whether the interference with the applicants’ 
freedom of expression was “prescribed by law,” instead choosing 
to decide this case on the basis of the proportionality of the 
interference.209 The ECtHR concluded that the interference with the 
applicants’ freedom of expression was for the purpose of a 
legitimate aim—“protecting the rights of others.”210 The ECtHR 
then based its conclusions regarding the merits of this case by 
examining whether the Russian government’s interference with the 
applicants’ freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court indicated that when it comes to Article 10(2) of 
the ECHR, there is “little scope…for restrictions on political speech 
 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at ¶ 198. 
205 Id. at ¶ 199. 
206 Id. at ¶ 201. 
207 Id. at ¶ 206. 
208 Id. at ¶ 207. 
209 Id. at ¶ 208. 
210 Id. at ¶ 210. 
2019 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 27:1 
 
or debates on questions of public interest.”211 Furthermore, giving 
an artistic performance or political speech in a public place, 
depending on the nature and purpose of the place, may require 
respect for certain rules of conduct.212 Since the applicants’ 
performance took place in Moscow’s Christ the Saviour Cathedral, 
it did violate certain accepted rules of conduct in a place of religious 
worship; thus, imposition of certain sanctions could be justified.213 
However, the ECtHR also noted that the applicants’ performance 
did not disrupt religious services or cause injuries to people inside 
the cathedral or damage to church property. Given these factors, 
the ECtHR found that the penalty imposed on the applicants was 
very severe in relation to their conduct.214 The ECtHR also noted 
that Russian domestic courts failed to examine the content of the 
applicants’ performance, but instead based their conviction of the 
applicants almost entirely on their conduct.215 
 The ECtHR noted that the applicants were convicted of 
hooliganism, motivated by religious hatred on account of the type 
of clothing that they wore, their body movements, and their strong 
language. Although the applicants’ conduct may have offended 
people, including churchgoers, nothing in their conduct amounted 
to incitement to religious hatred.216 The Russian domestic courts 
failed to examine whether the applicants’ actions “could be 
interpreted as a call for violence or as a justification of violence, 
hatred or intolerance.”217 There was also no examination of 
whether applicants’ actions could have led to harmful 
consequences.218 The ECtHR concluded that the applicants’ actions 
did not contain elements of violence and did not stir up or justify 
violence, hatred or intolerance of believers.219 The ECtHR stated 
that: 
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[I]n principle, peaceful and non-violent forms of 
expression should not be made a subject to the threat 
of imposition of a custodian sentence, and that 
interference with freedom of expression in the form 
of criminal sanctions may have a chilling effect on 
the exercise of the freedom, which is an element to 
be taken into account when assessing the 
proportionality of the interference in question.220 
 
The ECtHR concluded that while certain governmental actions 
towards the applicants may have been justified, the Russian 
domestic courts failed to justify how the criminal conviction and 
prison sentences imposed on the applicants were proportionate to 
the government’s aim.221 Hence, the interference with the 
applicants’ freedom of expression was not necessary in a 
democratic society222 and constituted a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR.223 It is clear that while the Russian domestic court framed 
the Pussy Riot case as revolving around religious speech, the 
ECtHR, very early on, stated that the case was clearly about 
political speech and, therefore, the finding of a violation of Article 
10 was almost to be expected.  
 Despite the differences in framing of the Pussy Riot case by 
the Russian domestic courts and the ECtHR—as either religious or 
political speech—the case points to a broader issue than the one of 
politics vs. religion. Ultimately, Pussy Riot’s performance and 
subsequent legal cases were about the ability of “contentious 
pluralism”224 and dissent to counter the carefully constructed 
government narrative of “traditional values” and moral 
sovereignty.225 The reason why Pussy Riot’s members faced severe 
criminal sanctions in the first place was not due to their offence of 
religious feelings, but rather because they were trying to gain a 
foothold in the Russian public sphere and were thus threatening 
the Russian state’s carefully constructed “information 
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sovereignty.” The women of Pussy Riot engaged in the act of 
“contentious pluralism” and were punished in order to send a 
chilling message to other dissenters.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Pluralism and the conflict that it brings are considered to be 
threatening, as they put ideas into the public realm that compete 
with the official narrative. These ideas and their manifestations 
through human rights discourse are defined as threatening 
“traditional values” and thus political, legal, and moral 
sovereignty. Therefore, the Russian state’s current view is that 
pluralism is something that needs to be managed in a democracy, 
and democracy needs to be based on satisfying the interests of the 
majority.226 Thus, minority rights are considered only to the extent 
that they do not interfere with the majority.227 The Russian state has 
deliberately engaged in the construction of the “aggressively 
obedient majority”228—which is hostile to cultural pluralization 
and angry about the economic, social and cultural impacts of 
globalization229—through various forms of suppression of dissent. 
The Pussy Riot cases are an example of suppression of creative 
forms of dissent through redefining it as sinful, foreign and un-
Russian.  
Russia is certainly not unique in its uneasy relationship with the 
concept of pluralism, as even international institutions such as the 
ECtHR struggle to accommodate the idea of pluralism with the 
clash of rights that is frequently played out in the public realm. For 
example, the ECtHR wants to advance religious pluralism on one 
hand, while on the other hand some of its cases have trouble 
dealing with pluralism’s contentious nature.230 Ultimately, what 
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nations and institutions often fail to acknowledge is that the forces 
that assail pluralistic democracy are not foreign, but rather 
“internal to many, if not most, democratic nations…they are our 
own ideas and voices.”231 In other words, the conflict is not so much 
an external one, between a foreign and a domestic view of human 
rights and dissent, but is rather internal, “between people who are 
prepared to live with others who are different, on terms of equal 
respect, and those who seek the protection of homogeneity.”232 The 
protection of existing power structures and relationships, 
reinforced by the reliance on “traditional values” steeped in 
majoritarian consensus, is one of the key reasons why nations find 
the idea of true pluralism to be so threatening.233 Contentious 
pluralism continually aims to subvert power relationships and 
structures that emerge in the public sphere.234 Challenging the 
existing status quo is ultimately a call for transparency and 
accountability. However, transparency, accountability and 
examination of conflicts, injustices and inequalities in an open and 
honest way is precisely what citizens need in order to truly “justify 
a political structure . . . ‘for the right reasons,’ [rather than] because 
they are afraid of chaos.”235 If true commitment to pluralism exists, 
[t]he building of democracies, both existing and 
future, will depend on how a contested pluralism 
can construct new norms of recognition in which the 
roles at work and at stake in political dramas 
privilege a civil discourse that can take aim at the 
structures of power – for power and inequality, 
rather than conflict and contention, are the real 
culprits working against democracy and a truly 
“public’” sphere.236 
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Hence, accountability is key when it comes to pluralism in the 
public realm. This constant accountability is unimaginable without 
freedom of expression and the voicing of dissenting opinions, 
despite the ruling government’s attempts to consolidate its power 
by silencing dissenters and couching its actions as protecting the 
“traditional values” of the majority of the population. The role of 
the judiciary then becomes key when it comes to protecting the 
fundamental values that underlie a democratic society: “The 
legislative and executive branches of government [should] not [be] 
judges in their own self-interested cause. Rather, the judiciary is the 
guardian of the constitutional order.”237 Unfortunately, Russian 
courts, including the Russian Constitutional Court, have narrowed 
the space for pluralism and accountability by supporting the 
majoritarian conception of human rights espoused by the Russian 
state and by actively penalizing dissenters, as was evidenced by the 
Pussy Riot case.  
In order to live up to its constitutional commitment to 
pluralism, it is key for Russia to develop a safe space for public 
discussion pertaining to government, governmental 
representatives, and broader public policy issues. Such a culture of 
discussion is currently missing.238 Furthermore, creative 
communication cannot constitute an end in itself. Artistic forms of 
protest need to appeal and be accessible to larger audiences.239 
Thus, while Pussy Riot was widely supported outside of Russia, in 
Russia itself even Russian feminists discussed the harmful nature 
of their actions.240 Given the current widespread support for 
Putin’s policies by the “aggressively obedient majority” and the 
disconnect between Western and Russian conceptions of human 
rights, rapid social change is unlikely when it comes to pluralism 
and freedom of expression.241 
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